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RECUSALS AND THE "PROBLEM" OF
AN EQUALLY DIVIDED SUPREME COURT
Ryan Black and Lee Epstein*
INTRODUCTION
For over five decades now we political scientists have been
systematically studying the United States Supreme Court. We
have examined how the justices attain their seats 1 what factors
explain the Court's decision to grant certiorari, what impact
oral arguments have, 3 whether the Chief Justice self-assigns
particularly important cases, 4 why the justices vote the way they
do,5 what rationales they invoke to justify their decisions,6 and
in what ways those decisions affect social, legal, and economic
policy.7 In short, it seems as though no feature of the Court has
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helpful suggestions and comments, we thank Nancy Staudt and Tim Johnson. We used
STATA 8.2 to conduct the analyses and generate the graphs presented in this article. The
project's web site (http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/recusal.html) houses the database.
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escaped our attention-with one notable exception: recusal. A
search of political science articles in J-STOR8 on the term
"recusal" yields exactly one article, which, in fact, was not at all
about recusal. 9 We also ought note that broadening the J-STOR
search (to include terms such as disqualit! w/10 Supreme Court
or disqualifi! w/10 judge or disqualif! w/10 justice) was equally
unproductive, turning up no articles. By contrast, a Lexis search
of law reviews on that same term produces 1,395 articles.' 
0
Why the discrepancy exists is a good question, but we do
not think the answer is a lack of interest on the part of political
scientists. Quite the opposite. While a justice's decision to
recuse "isn't entirely . . . discretionary,"" as Justice Ginsburg
once said,12 neither is it entirely lacking in discretion:
[F]or ... a court of appeals judge on a three-judge panel...
[i]f there were any doubt, that judge could step out and let
one of her colleagues replace her. But on the Supreme
Court, if one of us is out, that leaves eight, and the
attendant risk that we will be unable to decide the case, that
it will divide evenly.... When cases divide evenly, we
affirm the decision below automatically. Because there's no
substitute for a Supreme Court Justice, it is important that
we not lightly recuse ourselves. 13
Ifill underscores Ginsburg's point when she notes that the
justices
8. Available at http://www.jstor.org/search. J-STOR, a subscription database, houses
the text of major journals in the humanities, sciences, and social sciences.
9. Stefanie A. Lindquist, David A. Yalof & John A. Clark, The Impact of Presidential
Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court: Cohesive and Divisive Voting Within
Presidential Blocs, 53 Pol. Res. Q. 795, 799 n. 2 (2000) (using the term "recusal" only to
explain why they excluded the 1949 term from their study-because "Douglas's equestrian
accident that year led to his recusal in a large percentage of cases").
10. Search conducted on Jan. 14, 2005.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (available at http://uscode.house.gov). For recent commentary
on § 455, see Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts,
87 Iowa L. Rev. 1213 (2002); for general analyses of disqualification law, policies,
precedents, and practices with some attention to the Supreme Court, see Seth E. Bloom,
Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 662 (1985); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J.
605 (1947); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 589
(1987). As an aside, while we understand that differences exist in the meaning of the words
"recusal" and "disqualification," for purposes of this essay we use them interchangeably.
12. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36
Conn. L. Rev. 1033, 1038 (2004).
13. Id. at 1039.
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enjoy the unreviewable power to determine individually
whether and when to disqualify themselves from cases in
which their impartiality could reasonably be questioned.
Historically this appears to have produced a highly
idiosyncratic application of the [disqualification]
standard. 14
By way of example, she points to Justice Marshall's decision to
recuse himself from cases in which the NAACP (or NAACP
Legal Defense Fund) appeared as counsel, 15 and compares it to
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's refusal to disqualify himself
in Laird v. Tatum.
16
That room for choice exists over the decision to recuse
provides the makings of a political science problem, 17 and we
14. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme
Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 Md. L. Rev. 606, 620 (2002); see also Jewell Ridge Coal Corp.
v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161, 897 (1945) (Jackson & Frankfurter, JJ., concurring) ("The
Court itself has never undertaken by rule of Court or decision to formulate any uniform
practice on [disqualification]. Because of this lack of authoritative standards it appears
always to have been considered the responsibility of each Justice to determine for himself
the propriety of withdrawing in any particular circumstances. Practice of the Justices over
the years has not been uniform."); Frank, supra n. 11, at 606 (noting that there are
"enormous difference[s] of opinion in the Supreme Court on the subject of
disqualification").
15. Thurgood Marshall served as counsel to the NAACP and, later, to the LDF.
16. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Laird presented a challenge to the Army's domestic intelligence
program. In their motion requesting Justice Rehnquist to disqualify himself in the case,
respondents alleged that Rehnquist's
impartiality is clearly questionable because of his appearance [when he served as
Assistant Attorney General] as an expert witness for the Justice Department in
Senate hearings inquiring into the subject matter of the case, because of his
intimate knowledge of the evidence underlying the respondents' allegations, and
because of his public statements about the lack of merit in respondents' claims.
Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 825 (1972). Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist denied that
motion. Id. at 839. More recently controversy has arisen over Justice Ginsburg's decision
to participate in cases brought by certain women's rights groups. See e.g. 150 Cong. Rec.
H2383 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2004) (statement of Rep. Pitts).
17. In some areas it appears that justices do not enjoy discretion; for example, "it's
money that matters." Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, Deciding Whether to Decide, 48 Fed. Law.
45, 45 (Feb. 2001). Or as John P. Frank once put it, "In short, Supreme Court Justices
disqualify when they have a dollar interest." John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In
Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 L. & Contemp. Probs. 43, 50 (1970). See also Ginsburg, supra
n. 12, at 1039 (noting that a justice's ownership of a single share of stock in a corporation
appearing before the Court is sufficient to require his or her recusal). But even that apparent
constraint may be subject to interpretation. See Bleich & Klaus, supra this note, at 46
(recognizing that even the "hard and fast" money rule, however, is not inviolable); see also
Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge's Relative Is Affiliated with Counsel of Record: The
Ethical Dilemma, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1181, 1194-96 (2004) (referring to the 1993
commentary associated with the Statement of Recusal Policy, Supreme Court of the United
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can think of many possible solutions. It may be, for example,
that a justice is less willing to recuse herself in cases she thinks
will produce an equally divided Court-a possibility to which
Justice Ginsburg alludes above. So too, it could be that certain
kinds of justices, perhaps those who are pivotal in a particular
area of the law or who have been on the Court for some period
of time, may also be less inclined to remove themselves from
particular cases.
Other explanations are readily apparent, and later we
discuss several. But the larger point is that a dearth of
possibilities hardly exists. Where there is a void-and what we
think explains the lack of research on recusal-is in the data to
assess those explanations, and the near insurmountable obstacles
in collecting such data. Fundamentally, the problem boils down
to this: While we can observe when justices recuse themselves,
we cannot observe when they considered recusing themselves
but did not. 18  We thus lack a "denominator" for testing
hypotheses about the decision to recuse; only by assuming that a
justice could choose against participating in each and every case
could we develop one.' 9 But that assumption is insufficiently
realistic to put to use in serious research.
States, that describes the circumstances under which seven Justices (all but Justices
Blackmun and Souter) indicate that they would or would not recuse themselves if a relative
is a lawyer in a firm appearing before the Court); Ifill, supra n. 14, at 624-26 (same);
Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote
Illegally? 16 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 375, 425-26 (2003) (same).
18. Or, as the Chief Justice put it in a letter to Senator Patrick Leahy, "While a member
of the Court will often consult with colleagues as to whether to recuse in a case, there is no
formal procedure for Court review of the decision of a Justice in an individual case. This is
because it has long been settled that each Justice must decide such a question for himself."
Ltr. from Rehnquist, C.J., U.S. S. Ct., to U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy (Jan. 26, 2004), reprinted
in Irrecusable and Unconfirmable, 7 Green Bag 2d 277, 280 (2004). And Justices may
consult with outside experts as well. See Tony Mauro, Breyer Consulted Ethics Expert over
Sentencing Case Recusal, Leg. Times 10 (Jan. 17, 2005) (indicating that Justice Breyer
consulted a law professor with expertise in legal ethics when deciding whether he should
participate in the federal-sentencing-guideline cases).
19. We suppose we could examine motions filed by counsel asking justices to
disqualify themselves. But, as Ifill, supra n. 14, at 622, notes, "Although recusal motions
are filed against Justices on the Court, most litigants do not seek disqualification ...
because to do so suggests a lack of confidence in a Justice's ability to evaluate the issues
objectively." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), may provide an example. While several
scholars have raised questions over whether one or more justices should have recused
themselves from the case, no party sought the disqualification of any Court member.
Representative of the articles raising the recusal question are Bleich & Klaus, supra n. 17,
at 45 ("[N]one of the justices recused themselves from [Bush v. Gore] (although many
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And we do not. What we do instead is take a more
manageable cut at the problem of recusal and study whether it is
in fact a problem. We raise this question in light of the
abundance of commentary echoing Justice Ginsburg's concern:
that Supreme Court justices ought not take recusal "lightly"
because of the possibility of a four-to-four split. As Bleich and
Klaus note,
[I]n a case where one justice is recused, an even number
remains, which creates a risk of deadlock by an equally
divided Court. Just last term, for example, Justice
O'Connor was recused in a case concerning the scope of
federal removal jurisdiction, because she owned stock in
one of the parties. The court wound up deadlocking, 4-4,
and as a result an important issue of federal procedural law
was not decided and remains the subject of a split between
the federal circuits today.
20
Justice Scalia apparently concurs with this general
sentiment. In a controversial memorandum explaining his
decision to participate in Cheney v. United States District
Court,21 he wrote:
Let me respond, at the outset, to Sierra Club's suggestion
that I should "resolve any doubts in favor of recusal." That
might be sound advice if I were sitting on a Court of
Appeals.... On the Supreme Court, however, the
consequence is different: The Court proceeds with eight
Justices, raising the possibility that, by reason of a tie vote,
it will find itself unable to resolve the significant legal issue
presented by the case.... A rule that required members of
this court to remove themselves from cases in which
issues of partisanship were raised by the press.)"), Ifill, supra n. 14, and Neumann, supra n.
17.
20. Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, Deciding Whether to Decide: Should There Be
Standards for Recusal? 61 Or. St. B. Bull. 9, 18 (Nov. 2000). See also Frank, supra n. 11,
at 608 ("[I]f a justice sits who should not, great interests may be jeopardized; but if a
justice disqualifies who should not, vital questions may be needlessly left without
authoritative decision."); William L. Reynolds & Gordon G. Young, Equal Divisions in the
Supreme Court: History, Problems, and Proposals, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 29, 31 (1983)
("problems created by an equal division can be serious"); Bloom, supra n. 11, at 664-65
(arguing that "if an overly strict disqualification standard were applied at the Supreme
Court level, it could result in vitally important legal issues not being decided .... In most
circumstances where a quorum does not exist, the Court must affirm the judgment... [and]
the affirmance has no precedential value").
21. 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
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official actions of friends were at issue would be utterly
disabling.
22
And, now, Chief Justice Rehnquist has taken this idea to
new heights. Owing to his bout with thyroid cancer, he has said
he will only participate in cases "when necessary to prevent a tie
vote." 23 That Rehnquist would take this step is not altogether
surprising. Any number of times in the past he has expressed
concerns about the consequences of affirming judgments by an
equally divided Court.2 4
What we examine is whether this is a legitimate concern on
the part of the legal commentators and justices who have
expressed it. Specifically, we explore the extent to which
discretionary recusals produce an equally divided Court. As it
turns out (and contrary to some commentary), in only a small
fraction of cases in which one justice recuses him- or herself
(forty-nine out of 599) does a tie result.25
We develop this finding in three steps. First, we provide a
brief look at the "problem" of an equally divided Court; next we
present our analysis of the results of discretionary recusals.
Along these lines, we provide some descriptive data on recusals
22. Id. at 915-16 (memo. ofScalia, J.).
23. Charles Lane, Rehnquist Won't Vote in Every Case Heard This Term, Wash. Post
A08 (Dec. 14, 2004).
24. Consider, for example, his denial of the motion to recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum,
409 U.S. 824, 837-38 (1972):
While it can seldom be predicted with confidence at the time that a Justice
addresses himself to the issue of disqualification whether or not the Court in a
particular case will be closely divided, the disqualification of one Justice of this
Court raises the possibility of an affirmance of the judgment below by an equally
divided Court. The consequence attending such a result is, of course, that the
principle of law presented by the case is left unsettled. The undesirability of such
a disposition is obviously not a reason for refusing to disqualify oneself where in
fact one deems himself disqualified, but I believe it is a reason for not "bending
over backwards" in order to deem oneself disqualified[,]
and his statement in Microsoft Corp. v. U.S., 530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2000):
[I]t is important to note the negative impact that the unnecessary disqualification
of even one Justice may have upon our Court. Here-unlike the situation in a
District Court or a Court of Appeals-there is no way to replace a recused
Justice. Not only is the Court deprived of the participation of one of its nine
members, but the even number of those remaining creates a risk of affirmance of
a lower court decision by an equally divided Court.
25. We deal here only with the Supreme Court. For appellate court practices, see Daniel
Egger, Student Author, Court of Appeals Review of Agency Action: The Problem of En
Banc Ties, 100 Yale L.J. 471 (1990); for an interesting comparative analysis, see J.T.
Irvine, The Case of the Evenly Divided Court, 64 Sask. L. Rev. 219 (2001) (comparing the
handling of evenly divided cases in Canada, the United States, and England).
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since the 1946 term, as well as demonstrate that recusals
generally do not produce equally divided Courts. We end with a
discussion on possible explanations for our results and with
suggestions for future research on recusals.
I. "AFFIRMED BY AN EQUALLY DIVIDED COURT"
While several contemporary justices have written about the
"problem" of an equally divided Court, it is hardly a novel
issue. Indeed, as far back as 1792, the Court divided three-to-
three on a motion filed by the Attorney General-with the result
being a denial of the motion. 26 Three decades later when the
justices split in The Antelope,27 the Court once again affirmed on
the question that divided them "without much discussion." 2
8
Only in the following term, in Etting v. Bank of the United
States, did Chief Justice Marshall explain that "the principles of
law which have been argued cannot be settled; but the judgment
is affirmed, the court being divided in opinion upon it." 9
Subsequent cases have fleshed out Chief Justice Marshall's
words such that now, when the justices evenly divide, the
resulting decision ("affirmed by an equally divided Court"):30
* affirms the decision of the court below; 31
* binds the parties under the principle of res
judicata; 32 and
* carries no precedential weight.33
26. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 408, 409 (1792) ("But the Court being divided in opinion
on that question, the motion, made ex officio, was not allowed."). See Edward A. Hartnett,
Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 643, 653 (2002).
27. 23 U.S. 66 (1825).
28. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972).
29. 24 U.S. 59, 78 (1826).
30. The canonical cases here are Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960); Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205 (1910); and Neil v. Essex
Co., 74 U.S. 107 (1868).
31. See e.g. Durant, 74 U.S. 107; Etting, 24 U.S. at 78.
32. Durant, 74 U.S. at 109; Egger, supra n. 25, at 473; Reynolds & Young, supra n. 20,
at 35. Worth noting, though, is that "the appointment of a new justice... may be a ground
for petitioning for a rehearing." 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 832 (2004).
33. Eaton, 364 U.S. at 264 ("Four of the Justices participating are of opinion that the
judgment should be affirmed, while we four think it should be reversed. Accordingly, the
judgment is without force as precedent."). For commentary on these principles, see
generally Egger, supra n. 25, at 473-75; Hartnett, supra n. 26; and Reynolds & Young,
supra n. 20, at 33-35.
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Over the Court's use of these rules, little disagreement
exists; 34 in fact, as Hartnett explains, the justices have been
unwavering in their attachment to them.35
Nor does much disagreement exist over the problems
associated with equally divided Courts. 3 6 Aside from the sheer
34. In fact, there is so little disagreement that even the ever source-driven student-
edited law reviews do not seem to require the usual supporting citation when writers state
that affirmances by equally divided Courts lack precedential value. This is not to say,
however, that scholars have failed to debate the wisdom of these rules. See e.g. Thomas E.
Baker, Why We Call the Supreme Court "Supreme ": A Case Study on the Importance of
Settling National Law, 4 Green Bag 2d 129 (2001) (criticizing the practice of affirming by
an equally divided Court); Hartnett, supra n. 26, at 678 (defending it); Reynolds & Young,
supra n. 20, at 41-55 (proposing alternatives to the rule).
Questions too arise over the appropriate course of action when the justices evenly
divide over a case coming to them on original jurisdiction-in part because they have been
somewhat inconsistent in their practices, sometimes staying the proceedings (e.g. Va. v. W.
Va., 78 U.S. 39 (1870)), sometimes not (e.g. In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 ((1953)). See
Egger, supra n. 25, at 475; see also Hartnett, supra n. 26, at 657; John V. Orth, How Many
Judges Does It Take to Make a Supreme Court? 19 Const. Commentary 681, 686 n. 27
(2002). And there also is commentary (and the occasional controversy) over separate
opinions written in evenly divided cases. While
the usual practice is not to express any opinion, for such an expression is
unnecessary where nothing is settled, expressions... have been made.., where
there was a question whether one fact situation was to be distinguished from a
related one on which a majority of the Court had rendered an opinion.
Eaton, 364 U.S. at 264, 264 n. 1. For commentary on such "expressions," see, for example,
U.S. v. Barber, 119 F.3d 276, 286 (4th Cir. 1997) (Murnaghan, J.) (claiming that "Judge
Wilkins' opinion explaining the rationale of the seven votes of one side of the equally
divided court is inappropriate"). See also e.g. S.J. Meltzer, Student Author, United States v.
Greer: Is a Racial Inquiry Necessary for an Adequate Voir Dire? 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1700,
1709 n. 66 (1993) (explaining that although "an affirmance by an evenly divided court...
has no precedential value," opinions issued in U.S. v. Greer, 968 F.2d. 433 (5th Cir. 1992),
"will affect cases that come before the court in the future"); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization
and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 649, 687 n. 140 (2002) (noting that
while Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 (1840), "involved an evenly divided Court," the
position taken by Chief Justice Taney was later approved in dicta and in a leading
nineteenth-century treatise on the subject).
35. Hartnett, supra n. 26, at 653 ("The Supreme Court applied this broader principle
from the very beginning.").
36. On the other hand, many commentators point out the problems associated with the
failure to recuse. See e.g. Ifill, supra n. 14, at 619-20 ("Given the ... important interest in
maintaining the integrity and legitimacy of the Court, affirmances caused by split decisions
from an evenly divided Court and a greater burden on parties seeking cert may simply be
the unavoidable and necessary cost of strict compliance with 455(a)."); Stempel, supra n.
11, at 625 ("Although it would be preferable if the Court ... never made split affirmances
of inconsistent cases, it does not follow from this observation that any such inconsistency
justifies a relaxed view of judicial ethics and the recusal statute."). We return to this
commentary in Part LIl.
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"embarrassment" of issuing such decisions, 37  they are
inefficient: They take up precious space on the Court's plenary
docket, waste the time and energy of the justices and their
clerks, as well as tap the time, energy, and resources of lawyers,
litigants, and any amici curiae. 38 Then there is the matter of the
decision (or, rather, non-decision) itself. By "failing to provide
definitive statements of the law,' ' 39 thereby enabling lower
courts at least occasionally to continue on a collision course,
affirmances by an equally divided Court can leave a legal area
murkier than before the justices entered it. 40
37. See e.g. Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the "Mini-
Supreme Court," 13 J. L. & Pol. 377, 381 n. 34 (1997) (citing Lang's Est. v. Commr., 97
F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938), for the principle that enlarging the court could "lead to the
embarrassment of an evenly divided court"); Kenneth M. Fall, Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp.: The Supreme Court Encourages Disqualification of Federal Judges
under Section 455(A), 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1033, 1060 (1989) ("[A]fter finally granting
certiorari on a section 455 case, the Court may have found itself in the embarrassing
position of a four-to-four split, which would create no precedent.").
38. E.g. Bloom, supra n. 11, at 664 (noting that "the costs of delay and waste of
judicial resources may be very high"); Charles S. Collier, The Supreme Court and the
Principle of Rotation in Office, 6 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 401, 429-30 (1938) (indicating that
affirmances by an equally divided Court are a waste of "expense, effort, and
argumentation"); Robert Laurence, A Very Short Article on the Precedential Value of the
Opinions from an Equally Divided Court, 37 Ark. L. Rev. 418, 429 (1983) (pointing out
that "[t]he case has been briefed and argued" and that "[a]ll this, the argument goes, will be
wasted if the equal division creates no precedential value").
39. Student Author, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
1127, 1128 (1981) ("The Supreme Court has a role beyond that of resolving individual
disputes; it serves as a guide for private parties, legislatures, lower courts, and its own
future decisions. In order to perform this function adequately the Court must provide
definitive statements of the law.").
40. E.g. Laird, 409 U.S. at 837-38 ("[T]he disqualification of one Justice of this Court
raises the possibility of an affirmance of a judgment below by an equally divided court.
The consequence attending such a result is of course, that the principle of law presented by
the case is left unsettled."); see also Baker, supra n. 34, at 136 (noting that, because of the
Court's split in Free v. Abbott Laboratories, conflict in the circuits over the Supplemental
Jurisdiction statute "can only get worse"); Eric J. Gertler, Student Author, Michigan
Citizens for an Independent Press v. Attorney General: Subscribing to Newspaper Joint
Operating Agreements or the Decline of Newspapers? 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 123, 170 (1989)
("[Tihe Supreme Court, equally divided, issued a per curiam opinion in Michigan Citizens
for an Independent Press v. Attorney General .... By upholding the court of appeals'
decision without any reasoning, the Court failed to clarify the existing confusion in the law
and provided no guidance for future JOA applicants."); Kenneth J. Munson, Student
Author, Standing to Appeal: Should Objecting Shareholders Be Allowed to Appeal
Acceptance of a Settlement? 34 Ind. L. Rev. 455, 461 (2001) ("The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision in a four-four decision without
comment. Thus, the Supreme Court did nothing to clarify the confusion in the lower
courts."); Reynolds & Young, supra n. 20, at 32 ("[E]qual divisions can prolong a
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It is no wonder thus that when Justice Scalia recused
himself from Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,41
commentators expressed concern over the possibility of an
equally divided Court.42 It also is no wonder that generations of
justices have worked to minimize the possibility. We already
have mentioned Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision to participate
only in evenly divided disputes. This may be extreme, but it is
far from the only example of the Court or one of its members
taking steps to avoid the dreaded "affirmed by an equally
divided" disposition. When Justice Stone became ill, his
colleagues held over West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish43 because
"a decision by an evenly divided Court was thought an
'unfortunate outcome.' '44 Likewise, after the Court heard
arguments in NAACP v. Button,45 and after Justice Frankfurter
wrote a draft majority opinion (upholding the constitutionality of
the Virginia law), Justice Whittaker resigned, leaving the Court
(apparently) divided four to four. Rather than hand down a
evenly divided judgment, rearguments were ordered-with the
end result beinf a six-to-three decision rendering the law
unconstitutional.
geographical inconsistency that may cause major problems in the administration of a
federal program.").
41. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
42. See e.g. Vikram David Amar, Why Did Justice Scalia Decline to Participate in the
"One Nation under God" Case? FindLaw Legal Commentary (Oct. 31, 2003),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20031031.html (accessed Mar. 30, 2005; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); Charles J. Russo, The Supreme Court and
Pledge ofAllegiance: Does God Still Have a Place in American Schools? 2004 BYU Educ.
& L.J. 301, 325-26. As it turns out, the Court did not resolve the case on its merits, but
rather held that Newdow lacked standing to bring the suit.
43. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
44. Quoted in Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
620, 637 (1994); The same story appears in Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court, 80 Va. L. Rev. 201, 227 (1994). See generally Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme
Court of the United States 70-71 (Columbia U. Press 1928); Rosemary Krimbel, Student
Author, Rehearing Sua Sponte in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Procedure for Judicial
Policymaking, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 919, 944 (1989) ("Occasionally, the Court has
requested reargument before it has reached a decision because of an equally divided
Court.").
45. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
46. Before rearguments, Justice Frankfurter retired from the Court. He was replaced by
Arthur Goldberg, and Justice Whittaker was replaced by Byron White. Both voted to strike
down the law. Justice Frankfurter was critical of the ultimate decision, claiming that it was
the product of the appointment of "such wholly inexperienced men as Goldberg and White,
without familiarity with . ..the jurisprudence of the Court either as practitioners or
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Are these near-heroic steps necessary? To what extent are
equally divided cases actually a problem for the Court? The
extant literature suggests that they are,47 but as a general matter,
equally divided cases are relatively rare occurrences.
To see this, consider that between the 1946 and 2003 terms,
twenty possible vote combinations (e.g., ranging from three-to-
three to nine-to-zero) occurred across the 6815 cases the Court
decided after hearing oral arguments.48 The possibility of a
"deadlocked" Court existed for nine of those combinations (i.e.,
scholars or judges." David M. Levitan, The Effect of the Appointment of a Supreme Court
Justice, 28 U. Tol. L. Rev. 37, 60-61 (1996) (quoting Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil
Rights Law, 277 (Oxford U. Press 1994)).
47. See generally e.g. Bleich & Klaus, supra n. 20.
48. The table below shows the combinations.
Vote N Percent
3-3 2 0.03
4-1 2 0.03
4-2 10 0.15
4-3 51 0.75
4-4 72 1.06
5-0 4 0.06
5-1 7 0.10
5-2 78 1.14
5-3 250 3.67
5-4 1069 15.69
6-0 16 0.23
6-1 57 0.84
6-2 275 4.04
6-3 999 14.66
7-0 124 1.82
7-1 179 2.63
7-2 698 10.24
8-0 5080 7.45
8-1 546 8.01
9-0 1868 27.41
Total 6815 100.00
We derived these figures and all others reported in this article (unless otherwise indicated)
from Harold J. Spaeth's Original U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database (12/9/04 release)
and The Vinson-Warren Court Database (9/25/02 release), both available at http://www.as.
uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm (accessed July 1, 2005; copy of home page on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). The vote data shown above are Spaeth's
vote variable, with analu=0 and dectype=l, 5, 6, or 7.
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for Courts with an even number of justices: three-to-three, four-
to-two, four-to-four, five-to-one, five-to-three, six-to-zero, six-
to-two, seven-to-one, eight-to-zero)--or in 1319 (19.35 percent)
of the 6815 cases. But in only seventy-four total cases (i.e., in
fewer than six percent of the 1319 cases in which a tie was even
possible) did an actual tie result.
On the other hand, some variation over time appears to
exist. As we can observe in Figure 1, which shows the
proportion of cases in which a tie was possible and the
proportion in which a tie actually occurred,49 the latter has
increased monotonically across the four "chief justice" eras
included in our database. During the Vinson Court, zero percent
of the 165 cases decided by an even number of justices resulted
in a split Court; by the Rehnquist Court terms, that percentage
was 8.11 (fifteen of the 185 cases). Nonetheless, even 8.11
percent is smaller than we might expect. On a six-person Court,
four vote combinations are possible (six-to-zero, five-to-one,
four-to-two, three-to-three) and when there are eight justices,
five combinations are possible (eight-to-zero, seven-to-one, six-
to-two, five-to-three, four-to-four). If the probability of any
particular vote division was equal, then we would expect ties in
2/9, or 22.22 percent, of all cases. But that was not the case-
even during the Rehnquist Court years.
Vinson Court (1946-52)
Warren Court (1953-68)
Burger Court (1969-85)
Rehnquist Court (1986-03)
o 10 s 20 25
Percentage
Tie-Vote Possible r Tie-Vote Occurred
Figure 1-The percent of all cases (N=6815) in which a tied vote was possible(due to an even number of justices) and the percent of actual tied-vote
decisions as a percentage of the cases in which a tie vote was possible
(N = 1319), 1946-2003 terms.
49. We use Chief Justice eras, rather than terms, to secure a sufficient number of cases
on which to base the proportions.
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF RECUSAL AND EQUALLY DIVIDED DECISIONS
Figure 1 is suggestive: It seems to indicate that evenly
divided decisions rarely result from an even-person Court. But,
of course, at least some fraction of the split cases were the result
of a short-staffed Court (due to a vacancy) or judicial illness-
and not from a more "discretionary" recusal. Do the data return
the same results if we remove these sorts of cases from the
analysis?
To answer this question, we closely examined all cases in
which the official Reports listed one or more ustices as not
participating. For those instances, we eliminated two types of
recusals: illness51 and appointment effects.52  Because it is
impossible to know the specific rationale for each instance of
recusal, it is possible that our data include some recusals that are
less discretionary than others. Take, for example, when a justice
owns stock in a company before the Court. Tradition and federal
law 53 compel the justice to recuse herself, so the recusal is, for
all practical purposes, outside of the justice's discretion. (For our
analysis of the current justices, only Justice O'Connor is likely
to confront this situation in any more than a handful of
disputes.)54
50. Of course our procedures might have yielded imprecise results but our options are
limited since the justices are not required to explain their recusal decisions-and typically
do not. In fact, the justices seem more likely to publicly explain the choice to remain on a
case.
51. For illness we examined the number of consecutive cases in which a justice did not
participate. If there were four of more recusals over the course of two consecutive days of
oral arguments, we recoded these recusals (and any additional consecutive recusals) as
illness based. Ultimately 342 recusals (or 20.74 percent) were recoded as related to illness.
The mean for each justice was 10.65 recoded recusals but the median was zero, thus
indicating data skewed to the left. Indeed Justice Douglas (seventy-three recoded recusals)
and Justice Frankfurter (fifty-six recoded recusals) were the two largest outliers.
52. Another common feature of the data was recusal in cases for which oral arguments
occurred before a justice was appointed to the Court. A total of 360 recusals (or 21.83
percent) were recoded for appointment effects. The mean per justice was 11.25, but once
again the data were skewed to the left. Justice Stevens (sixty-three recoded recusals) and
Justice Kennedy (fifty-four recoded recusals) were the major outliers.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
54. Since joining the Court in 1981, Justice O'Connor has recused herself in forty-one
cases. In seven of those cases (or 17.07 percent), tie votes resulted. Justices Stevens and
Kennedy are the only two other justices currently sitting whose recusal "caused" an
equally divided Court (two of thirty-three and one of eight, respectively). Consider for
example, Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 658 (1994), in
which the Court was equally divided. An examination of Justice O'Connor's financial
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This potential problem aside, our procedures yield several
interesting results. For one thing, quite a bit of variation in
recusal practices exists across the justices in our data base-and
persists today. Figure 2, which plots "discretionary" recusal
rates of the current justices, underscores this last point. The
career rate of recusal ranged from the near trivial .001 for
Justices Ginsburg and Souter (meaning that in only 1 percent of
all cases did they disqualify themselves for reasons other than
health or appointment) to the far higher .016 for Justice
O'Connor. That O'Connor recused herself in a greater fraction
of cases than her colleagues would, as we imply above, hardly
surprise commentators. As Bleich and Klaus note,
Each year the greatest number of recusals are logged by
Justice O'Connor, who it appears has investments in
several U.S. corporations that sometimes seek court review.
The frequency with which she has recused herself in cases
involving these parties has caused court-watchers to give
such cases the acronym 'OOPS'(O'Connor Owns Party
Stock).55
What is somewhat more surprising is the relative dearth of
recusals in recent years by almost all the justices (O'Connor and,
to a lesser extent, Stevens are exceptions).56
disclosure forms reveals that she held stock in Morgan Stanley Dean Witter. Kent Cooper
& Tony Rammond, Money in Politics Databases, Political Money Line, available at http://
www.politicalmoneyline.com/docs/OConnor_pfd_2002.pdf (accessed on Feb. 17, 2004;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). Thus it is reasonable to
presume that her recusal in this case, and the tie itself, should not be regarded as
discretionary. This finding actually helps support our conclusion that discretionary recusals
do not lead to equally divided Courts. If we recoded any fraction of those seven ties from
our results and the corresponding recusals (plus the other recusals not resulting in a divided
court), then the percentage of cases with an even-staffed court that lead to recusal would
actually decrease.
55. Bleich & Klaus, supra n. 20, at 12.
56. Our analysis does not include October Term 2004, which was still in session as we
were writing.
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O'Connor
Term Term Term
S 7
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Term
1970 1975 19W 1985 199 1995 2000 2005
Term
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1999 200 2005
Term
Ginsburg
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2009 2005
Term
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Term
Breyer
--"?-? - --... ---- f--- CT
1970 1975 190 1985 1990 1995 200 2905
Term
Figure 2-Proportion of cases in which justices of the current Court
did not participate for reasons other than health and appointment
date.
That justices of the Rehnquist Court have taken fewer
discretionary recusals is hardly illusory, as Figure 3 shows.
There we depict the proportion of such "disqualifications"
during the three previous eras.57 Notice the monotonic decline,
such that during the Vinson Court era, in 17.87 percent of the
cases at least one justice recused himself; by the Rehnquist
Court, that figure fell to under five percent (4.89).58
57. The mean across the 6815 cases is .120, with a standard deviation of.325.
58. From 1946 through 1988 the percentage of cases with at least one recusal varies
from as low as five percent in 1982 to as high as thirty-three percent in 1968. From 1989
through 2003, the variance is much lower. The percent declines to zero in 1992, but never
exceeds eight percent.
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Virson Court (46-52) Warren Court (53-68) Burger Court (69-85) Rehnquist Court (8603)
Figure 3-Proportion of cases in which justices of four Court eras did
not participate for reasons other than health and appointment date.
N=761 for the Vinson Court; N=1816 for the Warren Court;
N=2439 for the Burger Court; and N= 1799 for the Rehnquist Court.
We have a bit more to say about these interesting patterns
in Part III. For now, though, let us return to our primary
concern-the extent to which "discretionary" recusals (again,
those related neither to health nor appointments) lead to
judgments affirming "by an equally divided Court." Overall,
across the 6815 cases, "discretionary" recusals that could have
produced evenly split decisions occur in 599 cases (or 8.79
percent). 59 But of those 599 cases, as Figure 4 shows, only forty-
nine (or 8.18 percent) resulted in ties. (By contrast, 236 (or
39.40 percent) produced eight-to-zero decisions.)
59. Discretionary recusal, viewed as a dichotomous event (that is, either yes or no),
occurs in 817 of our 6815 cases (or 11.99 percent). This figure does not distinguish among
the number of recusals present in each case, however. For the cases we examined, there
were 120 cases with two recusals and nine cases with three recusals. Additionally, there
were ninety-eight cases with one recusal and a second vacancy on the Court, thereby
producing an odd number of justices. We arrive at the 599 figure by subtracting from 817
the 120 cases with two recusals and the ninety-eight cases with one recusal and another
vacancy.
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No discretionary
recusal:
6815 total cases 6216 (91.21%)(194-203 tems)Evenly divided Court
(1946-2003 terms) does not result:
Discretionary 550 (91.82%)
recusal:
599 (8.79%)
Evenly divided Court
does result:
49(8.81%)
Figure 4-Cases leading to an "affirmed by an equally divided
Court."
Again, this figure of 8.18 is smaller than we would
anticipate,60 though era-by-era variation is evident as Figure 5
indicates. 61 Note that in none of the Vinson Court cases (1946-
1952 terms) with a discretionary recusal did an evenly divided
Court result; that figure rose during the Warren and Burger
Courts but hit new heights in the Rehnquist Court era, at 14.66
percent (11 of the 75 cases).62
60. One easily accessible calculation considers the overall frequency of minimum
winning coalitions as a surrogate for contentious decisions. Indeed, if a case did result in an
equally divided Court, it is likely that given a full Court, the actual decision would be a
minimum winning coalition. From the Supreme Court Database, see n. 48, supra, we
found that minimum winning coalitions are present in 18.92 percent of all cases. From the
above calculations, we know that even-membered courts occur 8.79 percent of the time.
Multiplying these two independent events together, we arrive at 1.6 percent. This
represents a rough estimate of the percentage of cases that should both have been decided
by a minimum winning coalition and have possessed an even number of justices. Over the
population of the database, there are 6815 cases, so we should expect nearly 114 cases
[.016 x 6815] that are equally divided. In fact, we observe just forty-nine, which is only
42.98 percent of our expected number of equally divided cases.
61. Again we group the data by Chief Justice to ensure a sufficient number of cases on
to which to base the proportion. Other possibilities, such as term or natural court, do not
yield ten or more cases in each grouping.
62. This statistic might be slightly misleading, however. While the percentage of cases
in which an equally divided Court resulted from a discretionary recusal is high during the
Rehnquist years, the raw numbers are quite low. In only seventy-five cases was a tie
possible during the Rehnquist Court. By contrast, there were 218 possible ties during the
Warren Court and 225 during the Burger Court. The term with the greatest number of ties
is 1970, when there were five (out of a possible twenty-one). Several other years-1957,
1967, 1980, and 1988-had three ties per term.
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Figure 5-Proportion of cases in which a discretionary recusal led to
an "affirmed by an equally divided Court."
On the other hand, over the period from 1986-2003, the
number of evenly divided cases occurring from a recusal is
fewer than one per term: It was only .647 (eleven ties owing to
discretionary recusals over the seventeen-term period)-a
smaller proportion than that produced during either the Warren
(1.133 per year) or Burger (1.312) Courts. Moreover, by most
any indication none of those eleven cases seemed especially
salient.63 This is not to say that the Court has never divided over
63. Assessing case "salience" is no easy matter, especially for those cases lacking a
majority or even plurality opinion. One possibility is whether the New York Times covered
the litigation prior to the Court's decision. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring
Issue Salience, 44 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 66 (Jan. 2000). On this measure we would deem
"salient" only three of the twelve cases: Borden Ranch Partn. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engrs., 537 U.S. 99 (2002) (prompting an article on oral arguments in the case); Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (prompting an article when the Court
granted certiorari); Morgan Stanley, 511 U.S. 658 (same). We also looked at the number of
law review articles, notes, and essays mentioning the lower court's decision in these cases.
The minimum was one; the maximum was forty-six, and the mean was 28.58. Whether this
is high, low, or somewhere in between is hard to assess because it is difficult to know the
standard against which to judge it. On the other hand, in light of the number of law review
articles published over the period covered by our cases, it hardly strikes us as excessive.
Finally, a piece of anecdotal evidence comes from Baker, who invokes one of the eleven
cases, Free v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000), to highlight the need for the
justices to work to avoid evenly-divided decisions--even though by the author's own
admission "Free will not be highlighted in any of the annual most-important-cases-of-the-
term articles." Baker, supra n. 34, at 129.
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an important dispute, 64 but, rather, to suggest that the data tend
to support Ifill's conclusion: "In scores of cases each year, one
or more of the Justices recuses him or herself without doing
violence to the orderly operation of the Court and its decision-
making function."
65
Perhaps doing far more "violence" are other "inefficient"
procedures sometimes invoked by the justices, 66 though none
perhaps more so than plurality decisions. "Opinions announcing
the judgment of the Court" are, of course, distinct from
affirmances by an equally divided Court,67 but commentary
occasionally analogizes them.68 One might speculate that if a
justice recuses herself, then the chances of a plurality decision
will increase. The data do not seem to support this conclusion,
however. Over the fifty-seven terms analyzed, we observe forty-
nine equally divided Courts (resulting from discretionary
recusals) but only nineteen judgments that occur when there is a
discretionary recusal (or, on average, .860 ties and .333
64. Numerous scholars point to Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 430 U.S. 703
(1977), as an example.
65. Ifill, supra n. 14, at 619.
66. In addition to judgments we think here of DIGs (dismissals of certiorari as
improvidently granted) and disputes argued but left unresolved owing to matters of
justiciability, such as mootness and ripeness.
67. For example, prior to 1977, plurality decisions generally lacked precedential value;
only the result was considered "authoritative." In Marks v. U.S., however, the Court set out
the "narrowest grounds" rule: "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds."' 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153,
169 n. 15 (1976)). For more on plurality decisions and, in particular, on their precedential
value, see Ken Kimura, Student Author, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of
Plurality Decisions, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1593 (1992); Linda Novak, Student Author, The
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 756 (1980);
Mark Alan Thurmon, Student Author, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 Duke L.J. 419 (1992).
68. E.g., Sean Pager, Is Busing Preferential? An Interpretive Analysis of Proposition
209, 21 Whittier L. Rev. 3, 46, n. 237 (1999) ("Although Justice Powell wrote for himself
[in Bakke], his was the deciding vote among an evenly divided Court."); Richard L. Revesz
& Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1067,
1098, 1098 n. 130 (1988) ("Consider a federal criminal case in which four Justices join an
opinion affirming the judgment of the lower court, four Justices dissent on the merits, and
the remaining Justice asserts that the case does not warrant the Court's attention and
therefore does not address the merits at all .... This situation is akin to one in which a case
is 'affirmed by an equally divided Court."').
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judgments per term). 69 Far outnumbering these nineteen
judgments are the 195 that occur when no justice
(discretionarily) recuses him- or herself. Seen in this way, our
data run contrary to common belief; discretionary recusal does
not appear to lead to an appreciable increase in either equally
divided Courts or plurality opinions.
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Term
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
- Judgments -... Ties
Figure 6-Number of cases resulting in a plurality opinion and an
"affirmed by an equally divided Court" (as a result of a discretionary
recusal), 1946-2003 Terms.
III. DIsCusSION
In an article on the Hughes Court, Richard Friedman
offered the following thought experiment:
Suppose Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland, instead of
retiring in 1937 and 1938, respectively, had remained on
the Court until their deaths. Suppose also that Justice
69. We use the Supreme Court Databases, supra n. 48, coding to calculate judgments
(analu=O; dec-type=7).
I ll ~i t=q
Q
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Butler, instead of dying in 1939, lived and served on the
Court until March 1941. Would we talk very much about
the Constitutional Revolution of 1937? As suggested by
this question, the course of decisions over the remaining
years of the Hughes Court would have been very different
had the liberals not been fortified by new members. In
several areas, significant liberal victories would have been
defeats.
70
Friedman went on to suggest that "Numerous conservative
lower court decisions on constitutional matters would have been
left standing by an equally divided Court," 71 including Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,7 Helvering v. Gerhardt,73 Helvering
v. Mountain Producers Corp. ,74 and Johnson v. Zerbst.75
Such "predictions" are not unusual in the law literature76
but our analysis may cast some doubt on them-at least as they
pertain to "equally divided Court" decisions. In general, that is
because tie votes are rare. Even rarer, though, are tie votes that
are the result of discretionary recusals. Such ties occurred in
only forty-nine cases across the fifty-seven terms in our data
base and occurred in cases of (perhaps) limited salience at
that. 7
Why don't we observe more opinions affirming the
judgment by an equally divided Court? On this question we can
only speculate, but several possibilities present themselves. It
simply could be that justices are more likely to recuse
themselves in cases they think will not result in split vote.78
70. Richard D. Friedman, Switching in Time and Other Thought Experiments: The
Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1891, 1978-79
(1994).
71. Id at 1980.
72. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
73. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
74. 303 U.S. 387 (1938).
75. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
76. See e.g. Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New
Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 Geo. L.J. 1519, 1566 (1987) ("In
three of the most important decisions of the last several years-Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps,
and Bose v. Consumers Union-retired Justice Lewis Powell was in the five to four
majority. If the issues in those three important cases were to appear before the Court as
presently constituted, the votes would apparently be split four to four, with the newest
Supreme Court nominee, Anthony Kennedy, holding the balance.").
77. See supra n. 63.
78. It also could be that the Court holds over cases that result in a divided vote. But our
data eliminate that possibility by focusing only on cases in which a particular sort of
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Hence, the justices themselves generate the data we observe
from a self-conscious decision not to abandon likely equally
divided cases. But other explanations are equally apparent. For
example, some have speculated that "when the issue has been
left undecided by an evenly divided court, the temptation to
renew the battle in the next case or with the next change in the
court is all the greater." 79 If this is so, we might speculate that a
participating justice will cast a "sophisticated" vote (in an
apparent four-to-four case) to avoid a future decision that may
be even more distant from her policy preferences than the one
issued by the five-to-three Court that she has agreed to join.
80
Along similar lines, we think it quite possible that a justice may
"change" her vote to avoid an equally divided Court for
institutional reasons as well. Such concerns may explain Justice
Frankfurter's decision to join Justice Clark's opinion for the
Court in Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.:
81
In accordance with the views that I expressed in Rogers v.
Missouri Pacific R. Co., . . .and in which I have since
persisted, the appropriate disposition would be dismissal of
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. If these
views were enforced under the special circumstances of this
case, affirmance by an equally divided Court would result.
Thereby this case would be cast into the limbo of
unexplained adjudications, and the lower courts, as well as
the profession, would be deprived of knowing the
circumstances of this litigation and the basis of our
disposition of it. Since I have registered my conviction on
what I believe to be the proper disposition of the case, it is
not undue compromise with principle for me to join Brother
recusal occurred-not recusals relating to health or divisions produced by a short-staffed
Court. In other words, we focus on cases in which the same justice would likely have to
recuse him- or herself during the following Term as well.
79. Steven Bennett & Christine Pembroke, "Mini" In Banc Proceedings: A Survey of
Circuit Practices, 34 Clev. St. L. Rev. 531, 542 (1986). The authors wrote this in the
context of the Courts of Appeals but it may be equally apt for the Supreme Court.
80. By "sophisticated" we mean a vote that does not reflect the justice's sincere
preferences. On the possibility of such deviations, see Epstein & Knight, supra n. 5, and
Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 Mich.
L. Rev. 2297, 2299 (1999). On the other hand, there is at least one case in which a justice
switched his vote to produce an evenly divided Court. See Edward Lazarus, Closed
Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles inside the Supreme Court
69 (Random House 1998) (discussing Justice Stevens's actions in Tompkins v. Texas, 490
U.S. 754 (1989)).
81. 361 U.S. 138, 141 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., writing separately).
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Clark's opinion in order to make possible a Court
opinion.
82
Whatever the explanation for the lack of evenly divided
cases, this may be a more interesting and even pressing matter
for future exploration than is a study of cases that do result in a
split vote-if only because the latter are so few in number. As
we already have detailed, in only forty-nine cases in which a
"discretionary" recusal occurs did a tied vote result; in the
remaining 559-or 91.82 percent-the Court was able to resolve
the dispute without reverting to an affirmance by an equally
divided Court. This finding alone commends greater attention to
the question of why more ties do not occur. It also may suggest
that justices ought worry less about producing an evenly divided
vote when deciding whether to recuse themselves-as Justice
Scalia suggested that he did in Cheney or as then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist implied in Laird. The possibility of such a
result, for reasons about which we can only speculate here, is
rather remote.
These are some of the implications flowing from our
analyses, but in general our study raises more questions than it
answers. For example, the data suggest that recusal rates overall
have declined since Rehnquist became the Chief Justice. Why?
One possibility is that the Chief himself has been particularly
discouraging of "bending over backwards ... to deem oneself
disqualified. ' ,83 This general view has been both applauded and
82. Id. at 142. For another example of voting to avoid a split Court, see the separate
opinion of Justice White in Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410, 429 (1969) (White, J.,
concurring) ("I join the opinion of the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since
a vote to affirm would produce an equally divided Court."). This language is repeated
verbatim by Justice Blackmun in U.S. v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 586 (1971) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
We ought note that Baker, as a normative matter, proposes that justices do precisely
what we suspect they might be doing: make an effort to avoid split decisions by changing
their votes. Baker, supra n. 34, at 130. Hartnett goes to lengths to shore up the "folly" of
Baker's proposal, Hartnett, supra n. 26, at 661, although in another paper, he cites
Frankfurter's apparent compromise in Inman. Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment,
Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 123, 141 (1999). But only by formalizing
Hartnett's speculation and conducting further empirical analyses would we be able to
assess fully his position.
83. Laird, 409 U.S. 824, 837; see also Microsoft, 530 U.S. at 1301-03 (statement of
Rehnquist, C.J.) (taking the position that a familial relationship with a lawyer involved in a
particular case is no ground for recusal, because reasonable people would not conclude that
the affected justice was likely to display partiality).
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condemned. But, once again, if it is based in some part on
minimizing a four-to-four split,85  perhaps it should be
reconsidered as well.
Then there are the many questions our study did not even
attempt to address-chiefly those that arise from the more
controversial form of behavior: the refusal to recuse. 86 Again,
these sorts of decisions are difficult to study but their
manifestations may be more easily susceptible to analysis. To
provide but one illustration, consider that in virtually every
analysis of the importance of recusal statutes, commentators
stress the need to foster "public faith" in the judiciary. If this is
as crucial as they suggest, then perhaps we ought to have
observed a decline in confidence in the Court or, more
pointedly, in Justice Scalia when he refused to recuse himself
from Cheney.87  What about when then-Associate Justice
84. See e.g. Bloom, supra n. 11, at 664-65 (enumerating "reasons for limiting
disqualification" of judges and justices); Student Author, Disqualification of Judges and
Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 736, 736, 747 (1973) (criticizing then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist's refusal to disqualify himself in Laird, and noting that "the
increasing frequency of disqualification might ... undermine public confidence in the
judiciary"); Frank, supra n. 11; Ifill, supra n. 14; Stempel, supra n. 11, at 590
(characterizing then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's failure to recuse in Laird as "a grave
error"). His refusal to recuse in Laird also became the subject of some controversy during
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's confirmation proceedings to be Chief Justice, though he
was hardly the first to face accusations of this sort. See e.g. 132 Cong. Rec. S23719 (daily
ed. Sept. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mathias). For another publicized example, see Frank,
supra n. 17, at 51-60 (describing the case of Clement Haynsworth). Nor was Rehnquist the
last; after his nomination to the Supreme Court, questions arose over Justice Breyer's
failure to recuse himself in several appellate court cases. See Stanley A. Kurzban, Legality,
Ethicality, and Propriety of Justice Breyer's Participation in United States v. Ottati &
Goss, 20 J. Leg. Prof. 139 (1995/1996).
85. The Chief Justice and others have offered a number of other justifications for not
"bending over backwards" to recuse, including a desire to limit the risk of equally divided
Courts. In addition, Lubet points out the consequences of a recusal at the certiorari stage,
explaining why it may "harm the very party is was intended to protect." Steven Lubet,
Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari Conundrum, 80 Minn. L. Rev.
657, 661 (1996).
86. In contemporary times, Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse himself in Cheney
provides an obvious example. But as Frank points out, controversies in the past are not
difficult to locate. See Frank, supra n. 11, at 605-06. One such controversy was actually
caused by Justice Jackson who, in Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S.
161, 897 (1945) (Jackson & Frankfurter, JJ., concurring), criticized Justice Black for
participating in the case. See Frank, supra n. 11, at 1.
87. Here we conflate concepts of confidence and legitimacy when, in fact, they might
be different things. See e.g. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Lester Kenyatta
Spence, Measuring Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
354 (Apr. 2003).
RECUSALS AND AN EQUALLY DIVIDED SUPREME COURT
Rehnquist participated in Laird? Both decisions were denounced
by some commentators, and Laird even became an issue in
Rehnquist's 1986 confirmation hearings. 88  But did these
"refusals to recuse" have any impact on the Court's legitimacy?
Bleich and Klaus suggest not, and circumstantial evidence
tends to support their view.90 So, for example, in response to a
survey question asking Americans which justice they would like
to see become the next Chief Justice, Justice Scalia ranked third
(after Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas).91 That poll was
taken only eight months after the appearance of Justice Scalia's
memo in Cheney.
92
Whether this and related evidence holds up under more
systematic scrutiny is yet another question that we commend to
others working in the field. While too often recommendations of
this sort are facile at best, they are not so here-at least not for
social scientists who have yet to devote sustained attention to the
fascinating subject of recusal.
88. See supra n. 84.
89. Bleich & Klaus, supra n. 17, at 47-48 ("Perhaps all this concern about the standards
for recusal among Supreme Court justices may be unfounded. There does not seem to be
any emerging public outcry about recusals."). Bleich and Klaus do go on to say, however,
that "[o]n the other hand, there may still be some corrosive effect on the public trust if there
is a widespread belief that the Court is applying too loose a standard for judicial
disqualification." Id. at 48. And one must note the reports that the Chief Justice's
appointment of a panel to study judicial conduct came in response to the public controversy
caused by Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse himself in Cheney. Justice Breyer, the panel's
head, has denied these reports. See e.g. David G. Savage, Rehnquist Panel Embarks on
Judicial Conduct Review, L.A. Times A26 (June 11, 2004).
90. A relevant line of research in political science examines the legitimacy of the
Supreme Court. This research finds that the Supreme Court can, in the public's mind, draw
from a deep reservoir of goodwill to help it weather extended controversies surrounding its
own work. (The prototypical example is that after its decision in Bush v. Gore the Court
experienced only a temporary drop in confidence). See e.g. James L. Gibson, Gregory A.
Caldeira, & Lester Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election
of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted, or Otherwise? 33 British J. Pol.. Sci. 535 (2003).
91. Fox News, Nov. 16-17, 2004. (The question was: "If Chief Justice William
Rehnquist were to resign, which U.S. Supreme Court Justice would you like to see elevated
to chief justice?") Results on file with the authors.
92. This result would tend to bear out the theories of scholars such as Gibson, who
suggest that the Court's "reservoir of goodwill" allows it to weather controversies whether
in the short- (e.g., the Cheney/Scalia controversy) or longer-term (e.g., the Court's decision
in Bush v. Gore). See Gibson et al., supra n. 87, at 354.

